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Published on: November 1, 2021

Court found no undue influence where the decedent’s testamentary plan is a natural progression. Probate Proceeding, Estate of Dorris (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 2021)

by Stephen Bilkis

On May 21, 2017, at age 86, decedent E. Lowell Dorris passed away testate. He was survived by 4 nieces and a nephew. However, in his will, he named Luis Freddy Molano as his sole beneficiary. The value of the estate was around $350,000. The decedent’s four nieces initiated a will contest, alleging undue influence. Benjamin Robinson, the executor and also the attorney who drafted the will, requested that the court dismiss the objection of the nieces.

A court will not allow a will that was made under undue influence to be probated. Thus, if the nieces prevailed and the will was found to be invalid, the court would either probate a prior valid will or the court would declare the decedent to be intestate. If the decedent is intestate and the nieces are the decedent’s intestate heirs, the nieces would share in the decedent’s estate.

Undue influence means that the testator drafted a will because someone illegally influenced them to do so. In other words, the terms of the will do not reflect the wishes of the testator, but the wishes of the influencer. The following circumstances tend to show the existence of undue influence:

Published on: September 1, 2021

Through a kinship hearing the court determined that decedent had children who were entitled to his estate. In re D.W.L, 71 Misc.3d 1204(A) (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 2021)

by Stephen Bilkis

Leaving a will is the best way to ensure that property left in your estate after you pass away goes to the people you want to receive it. Unfortunately, not everyone leaves a will. Intestate succession rules are in place to determine who is entitled to a decedent’s estate in the absence of a will. In other words, if you do not leave a will, New York provides a will for you. Under New York’s law of intestate succession, a decedent’s heirs are always their surviving spouse or children, if any. Other relatives, such as parents and siblings would only be entitled to a decedent’s estate if the decedent passed way without either a surviving spouse or children.

In the case of In re D.W.L., the decedent passed away intestate in February 2007 at the age of 33 due to accidental carbon dioxide poisoning. He was unmarried. He was survived by his mother. There were also 3 minor children who claimed (through their mothers) that the decedent was their father.

In September 2007 the decedent’s mother filed a petition for letters of limited administration. Initially she included in the petition that the decedent had 3 children. A year later she amended her petition to state that he had no children. This is significant because if he had no children, his mother would be his next of kin and entitled to his entire estate. On the other hand, if he had children, they would be entitled to his entire estate and his mother would not be entitled to any portion of his estate.

Published on: March 15, 2021

Partition may the only remedy when siblings cannot agree on ownership and use of property. Baucom v. Young, 2020 NY Slip Op 33826(U) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2020)

by Stephen Bilkis

Settling the estate of a parent is difficult for children. It is even more difficult when the children do not agree on how to handle property that they inherit together as tenants in common.

In Baucom v. Young, Dorothy Baucom died intestate on January 24, 2013, leaving 3 adult daughters: plaintiff Cheryl T. Baucom and defendants Deborah Young and Charlene Baucom. Defendant Charlene is developmentally disabled, and Deborah is her caregiver. Under New York’s law of intestate succession, because Dorothy did not leave a will with specific instruction as to how her estate is to be distributed, her 3 daughters were entitled to inherit her entire estate in equal shares. The main asset in the estate was a three-story residential property in Brooklyn.

Ideally, the sisters would decide privately how to handle the property. For example, one option would be to agree to sell the property and divide the proceeds equally. Another option would be for one or two of the siblings to buy out the sibling or siblings who does not want to own the property. Unfortunately, the three siblings in this case were not able to agree on the fate of the house on their own.

Published on: August 25, 2018

Appellant’s Claim Barred Due to Res Judicata, Collateral Estoppel

by Stephen Bilkis

Matter of A.

NY Slip Op 05842

The co-executor of the estate petitioned the court pursuant to 2103 to determine if certain funds were withheld from the estate of A. This appeal is from 2 Surrogate Court orders brought by A.S. Those orders denied AS her cross-motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5) to dismiss the petition regarding two bank accounts. This appeal is dismissed. The second order superseded the first. One bill of costs is awarded to petitioner, payable to A.S.

Published on: September 16, 2017

Court Decides if Petitioner Made a Case for Summary Judgment

by Stephen Bilkis

A New York Probate Lawyer said that, before the court is the motion of the nominated successor co-trustee of the trusts created under Paragraphs Second, Third and Sixth of the will of the decedent. Movant seeks summary judgment pursuant to CPLR 3213 granting his petition for appointment as successor co-trustee pursuant to SCPA 1502. In the alternative, movant asks the court to issue an order pursuant to CPLR 3126 striking the objections to his appointment which were filed by a trust beneficiary, for her failure to provide discovery.

The decedent died on February 14, 2008, survived by his wife, hereinafter, “the objectant”, his son, and his daughter. Decedent left a will dated October 27, 2004, as amended by codicil dated October 12, 2006. The will and codicil were admitted to probate by this court on April 4, 2008. In Paragraph Second of the will, decedent established a credit shelter trust for the benefit of the objectant. In Paragraph Third of the will, decedent established a generation-skipping trust for the benefit of the objectant. In Paragraph Sixth of the will, decedent created a residuary trust for the benefit of the objectant. In connection with each of the three trusts, letters of trusteeship were issued by this court on April 4, 2008, to the three nominated trustees and the objectant.

One trustee submitted his written resignation as trustee on February 2, 2010. The nominated successor trustee, executed a renunciation on February 11, 2010. On May 13, 2010, the trustee filed a petition with this court for permission to resign and for the appointment of hereinafter, “movant”, the next successor trustee nominated by the decedent in his will.

Published on: September 10, 2017

Court decides if surviving spouse is entitled to elective share – In re Berk, 897 N.Y.S.2d 475, 71 A.D.3d 883 (N.Y. App. Div., 2010)

by Stephen Bilkis

In 1982, the decedent, I. Berk, executed a will naming his sons, J. Berk and H. Berk, as the co-executors of his estate. The will also left his entire estate to his sons and his grandchildren. I. Berk was a successful businessman with substantial assets. Over time I. Berk’s physical and mental health began to deteriorate. Eventually he had to use a wheelchair to get around, suffered memory loss, and was often confused.

In 1997 the petitioner, H. Wang, who was a 40-year-old recent immigrant from China, began to work as the decedent’s live-in caretaker. Eventually, the decedent, became totally dependent on the petitioner, who was constantly with him. Friends of the decedent reported that the petitioner treated the decedent poorly, frequently screaming and shoving him, causing him to become tearful. A friend of the decedent alleged that the decedent told him that he was afraid of the petitioner.

In April 2005 the decedent was diagnosed with dementia by a physician who examined him in connection with a contemplated guardianship proceeding. That physician stated that the decedent was no longer capable of caring for himself or managing his own affairs. Despite this, on June 17, 2005, the petitioner and the decedent got married in the New York City Clerk’s Office. At the time the petitioner was 47 years old and the decedent was 99 years. Neither the petitioner nor the decedent ever told the decedent’s friends, family members, or associates about the wedding. In addition, according to a friend who saw the decedent every day, the decedent and the petitioner never showed affection towards each other and the decedent never wore a wedding band. The decedent’s sons learned of the wedding after the decedent died in 2006, as they were riding in a car to the funeral home with the petitioner. At that time the petitioner told them that she had married the decedent.

Published on: September 3, 2017

Carbon copy of a will submitted for probate – Levinsohn’s Estate, In re, 160 N.Y.S.2d 479 (N.Y. Surr. Ct., 1957)

by Stephen Bilkis

In this case the Surrogate’s Court had to determine whether to probate a carbon copy of a will where the original was purported inadvertently lost or destroyed.

According to the two witnesses, the decedent, L. Levinsohn, executed a will on or about February 27, 1948. They testified that all legal requirements were met. In addition, they testified that at the time Levinsohn executed the will, the decedent was of sound mind and memory and that he was not under duress.

One of the two witnesses was an attorney and was also the person who drafted the will. He testified that immediately after the will was executed, he gave it to the decedent’s son for safekeeping. This witness also testified that he made a carbon copy of the original will which he conformed and kept in his files. The witness submitted the carbon copy for probate.

Published on: August 27, 2017

Court Discusses Power of Surrogates

by Stephen Bilkis

This is a Mandamus case by the People, on the relation of individual. From an order of the Appellate Division in the Second Judicial Department, reversing an order of the Kings Special Term, which granted relator’s motion for peremptory writ, plaintiff appeals.

The relator was duly elected the surrogate of the county of Queens at the general eléction in 1910, and his term of office as surrogate of said county had not expired in 1915.

By chapter 443 of the Laws of 1914, which took effect September 1, 1914, chapter 18 of the Code of Civil Procedure ‘in relation to surrogates and the practice and procedure in Surrogates’ Courts’ was revised, and section 2538 thereof now provides: ‘In any proceeding in which any controverted question of fact arises, of which any party has constitutional right of trial by jury, and in any proceeding for the probate of a will in which any controverted question of fact arises, the surrogate must make an order directing the trial by jury of such controverted question of fact, if any party appearing in such proceeding seasonably demands the same. The surrogate in such order must direct that such trial be had either before himself and a jury, or at a Trial Term of the Supreme Court to be held within the county, or in the county court of the county. * * *’

Published on: August 26, 2017

Beneficiary of Trust is at Issue

by Stephen Bilkis

Testatrix died on March 21, 1954, leaving surviving her son as her only distributee. Her will was admitted to probate June 2, 1956. The delay was caused by difficulty in locating testatrix’ son. The will nominated the attorney-draftsman as executor and trustee but he renounced and the niece of testatrix and a beneficiary under the will was appointed administratrix c. t. a.

The will gives to said niece household furniture and other items and the balance of an account in the South Brooklyn Savings Bank after payment therefrom of funeral and estate expenses. Paragraph ‘Fourth’ creates a trust of the residuary estate for the benefit of testatrix’ son. The article in question reads as follows: “FOURTH’ All the rest, residue, and remainder of my estate, both real and personal, of whatever nature, and wherever situate, I give, devise and bequeath in TRUST, for a period of five (5) years from the date of my death, to my son, said trust is for the purpose of providing necessary clothing and medical care for my son. At the end of the five year period, if my son, cannot be located, then I give, devise and bequeath the remainder of this trust to my aforementioned niece. If my son should die before the five year period has elapsed, I give, devise and bequeath the remainder of the trust to my aforementioned neice. As trustee of this trust I hereby appoint my lawyer with power to invade the trust for the above mentioned purposes, no bond being necessary for the faithful performance of his duties as trustee.’

This proceeding seeks a construction of paragraph ‘Fourth’ of the will to determine the intention of testatrix with respect to whether testatrix’ son is entitled to the remainder of the trust or whether the niece is entitled to the remainder.

Published on: August 19, 2017

Attorney General Brings Action Regarding Revised Charter of New York City

by Stephen Bilkis

This action is in the nature of quo warranto, brought by the attorney general upon his own information, pursuant to section 1948 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The action is primarily against certain persons alleged to have usurped and entered into the office of city magistrates in the boroughs constituting the Second division in the city of New York. Pursuant to section 1954 of the Code, the persons who claim to have been elected to said offices, and rightfully entitled thereto, are also made defendants.

The complaint proceeds upon the theory that under section 1392 of the Revised Charter of New York City, enacted in 1901, there was a valid election in the fall of that year, at which certain persons were elected to the office of city magistrates in the boroughs of Brooklyn, Queens, and Richmond, who are prevented from discharging the duties thereof and receiving the emoluments belonging thereto by the unlawful usurpation of said office by the defendants above named. Said defendants, by their answer, challenge the constitutional validity of said charter provisions, and allege their own legal incumbency of said office pursuant to legal appointments made prior to said election. To this answer the plaintiffs interposed a demurrer on the ground that it is insufficient in law.

For the purposes of administration of criminal justice, the greater city of New York, under its original charter, enacted in 1897, was divided into two divisions. In the first division were the boroughs of Manhattan and the Bronx; in the second the boroughs of Brooklyn, Queens, and Richmond. Section 1390. When said charter went into effect, the office of city magistrate was in existence in the former city of New York, having been established by chapter 601 of the Laws of 1895. Section 1392 of said charter provided that the city magistrates in office when it took effect should continue to hold their office until the expiration of their respective terms, and should be known as the city magistrates of the First division; that their successors should be appointed in the same manner, and have the same powers and duties, as provided by said chapter 601, Laws 1895. The act just referred to provided that such magistrates should be appointed by the mayor for terms of 10 years. On account of the different conditions which prevailed in the boroughs of Brooklyn, Queens, and Richmond, the charter provisions relating to the office of city magistrate in these boroughs were more elaborate than those above summarized.