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Published on: July 27, 2026

Open Court Settlement Enforced in Probate Dispute: Matter of Roach, 2021 NY Slip Op 00434

by Stephen Bilkis

Many probate disputes end in settlement instead of a trial. When the parties reach an agreement in court, that agreement is generally binding. A person who later changes their mind cannot simply walk away from the settlement without proving there is a legal reason to do so.

In Matter of Roach, the Appellate Division, Second Department, considered whether a woman could undo a settlement she had agreed to during a contested probate proceeding after claiming she had been misled about an unsigned deed.

Background

Published on: May 18, 2026

Hostility Between Co-Executors Justified Appointment of Temporary Administrator: Matter of Pachis, 2025 NY Slip Op 32768(U)

by Stephen Bilkis

The Surrogate’s Court, Bronx County, addressed whether nominated co-executors who were unable to work together should continue administering a multimillion-dollar estate.

Background

Alicia H. Pachis died in July 2020 at the age of 94. She never married, had no children, and left a will making numerous charitable bequests. The will nominated Leonard Sammarco and attorney Reginald Asiedu as co-executors.

Published on: April 2, 2026

Earlier Will May Be Admitted to Probate by Agreement of All Interested Parties: Matter of Hayes, 2011 NY Slip Op 30416(U)

by Stephen Bilkis

Sometimes more than one will is found after a person dies. Although the most recent valid will usually controls how the estate is distributed, there are situations where everyone involved agrees that an earlier will should be used instead. In Matter of Hayes, the Nassau County Surrogate’s Court considered whether an earlier will could be admitted to probate when all interested parties agreed and doing so would better carry out the decedent’s estate plan.

Background

Arthur M. Hayes died in 2009, leaving behind his wife and their three sons. Because his wife suffered from dementia, the Surrogate’s Court appointed a guardian ad litem, an attorney whose job was to protect her interests during the probate proceeding. The decedent’s sons initially asked the court to admit a will that Mr. Hayes signed in 1990. Later, they changed course and asked the court to admit an earlier will that he had signed in 1982 instead.

Published on: February 3, 2025

Court Ordered Sale of Brooklyn Property Shared by Siblings Graffeo v. Paciello, 46 A.D.3d 613 (2d Dep’t 2007)

by Stephen Bilkis

In Graffeo v. Paciello, the Appellate Division, Second Department, reviewed whether a brother could force the sale of a Brooklyn property held with his sister as tenants in common. The case involved a long-standing dispute over ownership, control, and whether restrictions in a recorded deed could block a partition action.

Background Facts

In 1976, the siblings’ maternal grandmother transferred full ownership of a three-family dwelling in Brooklyn to her granddaughter, Debra Carol Paciello. Two years later, in 1978, Debra transferred the property to herself and her brother, Louis Anthony Graffeo, as tenants in common. The deed included a restriction that the property could not be sold or transferred during their mother’s lifetime unless she consented. After their mother passed away, both siblings had to agree to any sale or transfer, unless she had removed the restriction before her death.

Published on: December 26, 2022

Court construed the will to contain missing terms that were crucial. In the Matter of the Estate of Eugenia Herceg, 193 Misc.2d 201 (2002)

by Stephen Bilkis

When crucial terms are missing from a will, a court may construe the will to contain those terms if clear and convincing evidence establishes the testator’s intent.

Background

Eugenia Herceg died leaving a will, executed on December 2, 1999. The executor of the will was Columba Pastorino. The will included a residuary clause.

Published on: December 7, 2022

In re the Estate of Wilder, 49 Misc. 3d 1044 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2015)

by Stephen Bilkis

Jane A. Wilder died on July 31, 2014, a resident of New Hyde Park. She was survived by one daughter, Nancy Cave, as well as Nancy’s 3 children. Under the terms of Jane’s January 17, 2014 will, the decedent bequeathed her real estate, as well as her residuary estate, in equal shares to three grandchildren: Scott Cave, John Thomas Cave, and Jessica Cave. The will names Scott Cave as executor and John Thomas Cave and Jessica Cave as successor co-executors.

Scott Cave filed a petition for probate on September 9, 2014. Preliminary letters issued to him on September 15, 2014. The petition for probate lists as estate property the real property located at 1618 Falmouth Avenue, New Hyde Park, New York (the Falmouth Avenue property).

In response, Nancy filed a motion asking the court to issue an order (1) declaring that the Falmouth Property is not part of the estate of Jane A. Wilder; and (2) directing the to amend his petition for probate to remove any reference to the Falmouth Property, and to decrease the total value of the estate accordingly.

Published on: November 30, 2022

Court refused to reduce the amount of money transferred to a testamentary pet trust. In re Copland, 44 Misc. 3d 485 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2014)

by Stephen Bilkis

A pet trust is a legal arrangement that provides for the care and maintenance of pets that outlive their owner. See EPTL 7-8.1 (a). Typically money is placed in the trust and the trust agreement states who is the trustee and how the money is to be used. In some instances, the estate plan goes beyond providing money for the care of the pet. In some instances it even provides that the decedent’s home be maintained for the pets to live in.

In the case of In re Copland, Lenore Lewis Abels, the decedent, made extensive allowances for the care of her cats. However, the executor of her estate asked the Surrogate’s Court to approve a reduction in the amount of money transferred to the testamentary pet trust established under the decedent’s will.

Background

Published on: November 28, 2022

Where a will that was in the possession of the testator could not be located, it was presumed to have been destroyed. In re the Estate of Faragiano, 46 Misc. 3d 646 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2014)

by Stephen Bilkis

While this case primarily focused on an estate accounting issue, there was a secondary issue related to a revoked or lost will. Under the laws of New York State, only a testator can revoke their own will. In order to revoke their will, the testator must do one of the following:

Execute a new will
Execute a document that clearly indicates the intention to revoke the will. The revocation document must be executed with the same formalities required to execute a will.

Published on: November 2, 2022

Surrogate’s Court considered whether to lift restrictions on limited letters of administration. In re the Estate of Cridland, 30 Misc. 3d 415 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2010)

by Stephen Bilkis

In In re the Estate of Cridland, the administratrix of the estate, the decedent’s sister, sought to remove the restrictions from her limited letters of administration so that she could collect settlement proceeds from an action related to the death of the decedent, allocate the entire recovery to the personal injury causes of action, and judicially account for the proceeds.

In New York, before an individual or entity has the legal authority as the personal representative (personal representative, executor, administrator) to act on behalf of the estate of a decedent, they must petition the Surrogate’s Court and the court must issue them a court order called “letters.” There are several types of letters. Letters testamentary are issued if the petitioner was named in the decedent’s will to serve as executor. Letters of administration are issued if the decedent did not have a will. When letters testamentary or letters of administration, the personal representative typically has general authority to take actions necessary to settle the decedent’s estate.

Limited Letters of Administration are a type of letters issued by the court that allow the person to perform very limited and specific functions that are the best interests of the estate, such as commencing a lawsuit. Pursuant to SCPA 702, limited letters make be issued under the following circumstances:

Published on: July 18, 2022

Court determined that father’s estate was disqualified from sharing in deceased child estate due to abandonment. In Matter of the Estate of Chatham, 2010 N.Y. Slip Op. 51303 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 2010)

by Stephen Bilkis

Under New York law, when a child dies, a parent can be disqualified from inheriting from the child’s estate under two conditions. First, the parent can be disqualified if the parent did not provide support to the child as when the child was under the age of 21. Second, the parent can be disqualified if the parent abandoned the child. EPTL § 4-1.4.

In Matter of the Estate of Chatham, the administrator of the minor child’s estate was the child’s mother. She petitioned the court requesting that the child’s post-deceased father be disqualified based on abandonment and failure to support. The widow of the child’s father objected to the child’s mother’s petition to disqualify the child’s father.

Background