Articles Posted in Probate & Estate Litigation

Published on:

by

In a probate proceeding, the petitioner woman appeals from an order of the Surrogate’s Court dated October 16, 2007, as, after a hearing, granted those branches of the motion of the opponent man, which were to disqualify the petitioner from serving as executor for the estate of a woman and to reinstate letters of administration previously issued to the opponent man.

A New York Probate Lawyer said the court ordered that the order is reversed with costs, that branch of the motion of the opponent man, which was to disqualify the petitioner woman is granted only to the extent of requiring the petitioner to retain new counsel for the estate and that branch of the motion is otherwise denied, that branch of the motion which was to reinstate letters of administration previously issued to the opponent man is denied, and the matter is remitted to the Surrogate’s Court for further proceedings.

The right of a testator or the person who made the will to designate, among those legally qualified, who will settle his or her affairs, is not to be lightly discarded. However, the Surrogate Court may disqualify an individual from receiving letters of administration where friction or hostility between such individual and a beneficiary or a co-administrator or co-administratrix, especially where such individual is at fault, interferes with the proper estate administration, and future cooperation is unlikely.

Continue reading

Published on:

by

The Facts of the Case:

On 18 October 2007, a decedent died and is survived by his daughter-one and his granddaughters, A and B, the children of predeceased daughter-two, as his sole distributes. The decedent’s wife had predeceased him in September 2003. After the death of the decedent, the petitioner instituted an SCPA 2103 discovery proceeding. A New York Probate Lawyer said the petitioner is granddaughter B, who resides in Florida and to whom limited letters of administration (for estate administration purposes in an estate litigation) issued for the sole purpose of prosecuting the discovery proceeding and the respondent is daughter-one, who resides in Selden, Suffolk County. The property, subject of the proceeding, is a parcel of real property in Massapequa Park, Nassau County, and three bank accounts. Apparently, the real property was conveyed by the decedent to the respondent by deed dated 26 August 2004 and recorded 7 September 2004. The deed purported to convey all of the decedent’s right, title and interest in the property, except that it reserved a life estate in the decedent. At the time of decedent’s death, the bank accounts were held either jointly between decedent and respondent or solely by respondent.

In the SCPA 2103 proceeding, petitioner alleges that respondent was in a confidential relationship with the decedent and used that relationship to exert undue influence upon the decedent to convey the real property and change the title and/or beneficiary designations on the subject accounts. In opposition, respondent denies petitioner’s allegations and contends that all the transactions reflect the exercise of the decedent’s own free will. The respondent now moves for a summary judgment and for an order dismissing the petition and canceling a notice of pendency filed against the decedent’s former residence.

Published on:

by

The Facts of the Case:

On 22 February 2004, a resident of Hicksville died with a will dated 6 November 2002, months after a guardian was appointed on her behalf under Mental Health Law Article 81. The decedent left all of her property, other than a $15,000.00 bequest to a corporation, to “A”, to the exclusion of her family members. The will named “X” as executor and after he offered the will for probate it was revealed that he had a felony record, making him ineligible to serve as a fiduciary. Thus, on 2 May 2005, “X” renounced his appointment. A New York Probate Lawyer said the nominated successor to the named executor had previously renounced her appointment as well.

On 4 May 2005, “A” petitioned the court for letters of administration, for estate administration (estate litigation). However, “A” also had a felony record and was ineligible to serve. Therefore, on 9 June 2005, the court appointed the Public Administrator of Nassau County as temporary administrator. The decedent’s distributees appeared and filed objections to the probate of the will, and notices of appearance were filed on behalf of “A”, the New York State Attorney General and the aforementioned corporation. On 22 November 2005, all of the interested parties entered into a stipulation of settlement. On 1 February 2006, the will, as reformed and restated by the settlement agreement, was admitted to probate, and full letters of administration, were issued to the Public Administrator. Under the terms of the stipulation, articles second and fifth of decedent’s will were reformed so that three of the decedent’s distributes will share in 2/3 of the decedent’s real property and her residuary estate; the remaining 1/3 will pass to “A”; that the decedent’s real property will pass to these parties in kind, so as not to be subject to a commission, and that the property would be sold and the proceeds held in an attorney’s escrow account; and that before any distributions are made to the interested parties from the escrow account, the sales proceeds will be used to pay the bequest to the aforesaid corporations, the commission of the Public Administrator, and all debts, fees and estate administration expenses of the estate.

Published on:

by

The Facts of the Case:

On 26 October 2000, a decedent died with a Last Will and Testament dated 23 March 1995. Under the will, the decedent left her estate to her two sisters, A and B, or the survivor; named A as executor and B as successor. A predeceased the decedent without issue, thus, the entire estate passed to B.

Sometime in 2005, B petitioned for the appointment of a guardian of her property. The court, finding that B had a history of poor judgment with regard to her real and personal property management, appointed the petitioners, X, a niece, and Y, Esq., as guardians of B’s property. Consequently, in May of 2007, the judge authorized petitioners to petition to probate the 1995 will. By this time, the original could not be located and the petitioners petitioned to probate a copy of the 1995 will as a lost will. The affidavit of X stated that she located the copy among the decedent’s important papers after her death; that while the decedent must have had the original will, her house had been sold and the purchaser threw away all of her papers. The affirmation of Y also stated that after the decedent’s death, her home was taken over by a former handyman of B, who threw away all of the decedent’s papers. Allegedly, the instrument was prepared by an attorney, who supervised its execution and was a subscribing witness, and has filed an affirmation of due execution.

Published on:

by

The Facts of the Case:

On 2 October 2005, a resident of Sands Point died with a will dated 6 June 1996. He is survived by his wife, his children, A, B and C, and his granddaughter, X, the infant daughter of a predeceased son, D. On 21 September 2006, the will was submitted for probate (will contest proceeding) and letters testamentary issued to the decedent’s wife, the decedent’s daughter, A, and the decedent’s brother. On 23 April 2008, A and the decedent’s brother filed their account, which was subsequently amended and supplemented. Thereafter,a New York Probate Lawyer said a guardian ad litem was appointed by the court to represent the interests of X. The administration and the account reflect ongoing discord between the wife and the decedent’s other fiduciaries, A and the brother, dominated by conflict over the computation of the wife’s elective share. Ultimately, the parties executed a stipulation, receipt, release and refunding agreement which resolves all of the disputed issues other than the legal fee paid from estate assets to an attorney, who provided legal services to A and the brother at the onset of the administration but whom they later replaced. The stipulation provides that for purposes of calculating the wife’s elective share, the gross estate is valued at $2,115,942.00; that the expenses paid to date, plus the amount reimbursable to the wife for administration expenses which she incurred, total $438,817.00. The parties agreed that the fees of their current attorneys and that of the guardian ad litem be fixed by the court.

The Issues of the Case:

Continue reading

Published on:

by

In a court proceeding, a complainant filed a motion to stay pending the determination of an appeal from an order of the civil court. Upon the papers filed in support of the motion and the papers filed in opposition, the court consequently ordered that the motion is granted on condition that the appeal will be completed. New York Probate Lawyers said the complainant however was directed to pay the opponent any and all arrears in rent and/or use and occupancy at the rate previously payable as rent within 10 days from the date of the decision. They also need to continue to pay the opponent’s use and occupancy at a like rate as it becomes due. The court further ordered that in the event that any of the above conditions are not met, the court, on its own motion, may vacate the stay, or the opponent may move to vacate the stay on three day’s notice.

In another case, another appeal was also filed from an order of the civil court. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied the branch of the tenants’ motion in seeking an award of attorney’s fees.

The landlord initiated the holdover proceeding after terminating the tenancy based upon the tenants’ failure to cease using the basement portion of the apartment as a living room. Based on records, the said usage had resulted in the issuance of a violation by the department of buildings. Thereafter, the parties entered into a condition, contained in which was an agreement that tenants had cured the breach to landlord’s satisfaction by moving their furniture and personal items, and the matter was marked off the calendar so that the department of buildings could re-inspect the basement.

Published on:

by

In a will contest probate proceeding, the appellant woman appeals from a decree of the Surrogate’s Court which as granted the motion of the petitioner, Public Administrator of Kings County, for summary judgment dismissing her objections to admit the deceased person’s will dated September 30, 1977, admitted the will to for validation and determined that the will was validly executed. The court ordered that the decree is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs payable personally by the appellant.

The last will and testament purporting to be the will of the deceased man was executed on September 30, 1977, under the supervision of an attorney. New York Probate Lawyers said the will contains a confirmation clause and was subscribed by witnesses whose signatures were notarized. The will devised certain real property located in Brooklyn to one of the deceased man’s three daughters. The man died on November 30, 1977, and his will was filed with the Surrogate’s Court, Kings County, in April 1978. The man died without a valid will in 2000, and the Public Administrator of Kings County was appointed to oversee her estate.

In May 2003, a photocopied document was submitted to the Probate Department of the Surrogate’s Court, Kings County, purporting to be the will of the deceased man. The 2003 instrument provided that the real property was to be divided equally among the deceased man’s three daughters.

Continue reading

Published on:

by

In a court proceeding, a complainant filed a motion to stay pending the determination of an appeal from an order of the civil court. New York Probate Lawyers said that upon the papers filed in support of the motion and the papers filed in opposition, the court consequently ordered that the motion is granted on condition that the appeal will be completed. The complainant however was directed to pay the opponent any and all arrears in rent and/or use and occupancy at the rate previously payable as rent within 10 days from the date of the decision. They also need to continue to pay the opponent’s use and occupancy at a like rate as it becomes due. The court further ordered that in the event that any of the above conditions are not met, the court, on its own motion, may vacate the stay, or the opponent may move to vacate the stay on three day’s notice.

In another case, another appeal was also filed from an order of the civil court. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied the branch of the tenants’ motion in seeking an award of attorney’s fees.

The landlord initiated the holdover proceeding after terminating the tenancy based upon the tenants’ failure to cease using the basement portion of the apartment as a living room. Based on records, the said usage had resulted in the issuance of a violation by the department of buildings. Thereafter, the parties entered into a condition, contained in which was an agreement that tenants had cured the breach to landlord’s satisfaction by moving their furniture and personal items, and the matter was marked off the calendar so that the department of buildings could re-inspect the basement.

Continue reading

Published on:

by

A New York Probate Lawyer said in an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiffs allegedly sustained personal injuries when the limb of a tree fell onto the motor vehicle in which they were traveling, in the defendant Village of Great Neck Estates. Thereafter, a Nassau Estate Litigation Lawyer said that, the plaintiffs commenced this action, alleging, inter alia, that the accident and their resulting injuries were proximately caused by the negligence of the Defendant County of Nassau in failing, among other things, to remove a dead and/or diseased tree. A Nassau Estate Litigation Lawyer said that, the defendant County subsequently cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it on the grounds that the plaintiffs had not complied with the prior written notice requirement set forth in section 12-4.0 (e) of the Administrative Code of Nassau County and that it lacked both actual and constructive notice of the purported hazard. A Nassau Estate Litigation Lawyer said that, the defendant County additionally sought to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted by the plaintiff Lakeysha Agugbo on the ground that she did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d). The Supreme Court properly denied the County’s cross motion and held that: In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant County of Nassau appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Woodard, J.), entered February 21, 2007, as denied its cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it.

The issue in this case is whether defendant is liable for damages, for the injuries sustained by the plaintiff on the ground that the resulting injuries were proximately caused by the negligence of the Defendant County in failing, among other things, to remove a dead and/or diseased tree.

The Court in deciding the case said that, Prior written notice statutes apply to “actual physical defects in the surface of a street, highway or bridge of a kind which do not immediately come to the attention of the town officers unless they are given actual notice thereof”. Accordingly, the Court held that, the prior written notice requirement invoked by the County does not apply to the facts of this case. Furthermore, the County failed to establish a prima facie case that it lacked actual and constructive notice of the alleged hazard in this case. Lastly, the Court held that, the plaintiff Lakeysha Agugbo was not required to establish that she sustained a serious injury in the subject accident as she did not allege any negligence on the part of the County in the use or operation of a motor vehicle. Instead, the allegations against the County related to premises liability. Therefore, the Court held that, the County does not qualify as a covered person within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (j) and § 5104 (a).

Published on:

by

The plaintiffs own 1 of 20 lots comprising a subdivision known as Estates at Brookview. As such, the plaintiffs are members of the Estates at Brookview Homeowner’s Association (hereinafter the Association) and subject to its bylaws and “Declaration of Restrictions, Covenants, and Easements” (hereinafter the Declaration). A New York Probate Lawyer said that in the fall of 2004 the plaintiffs constructed a shed on their property. Upon inspection of the completed structure by the Town of Chester’s Building Inspector, the shed was approved and the plaintiffs were issued a certificate of compliance.

After complaints about the shed were received by the Board of Directors of the Association, the plaintiffs received a document entitled “Determination and Notice of Violation” (hereinafter the DNV), issued by the Board, advising them that their shed violated certain provisions of the Declaration. The plaintiffs contend that the Board lacked the authority to issue the DNV.

As a result, a New York Estate Litigation Lawyer said that, plaintiffs filed an action for summary judgment, declaring that the document entitled “Determination and Notice of Violation” issued by the Board of Directors of the Estates at Brookview Homeowner’s Association is null and void. A New York Estate Litigation Lawyer said that defendants filed a cross motion for summary judgment and for an award of an attorney’s fee pursuant to the Association’s bylaws and “Declaration of Restrictions, Covenants, and Easements.

Continue reading

Contact Information