Articles Posted in Estate Administration

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The decedent died on December 31, 1915. His will, made on October 20, 1915, was admitted to probate on March 31, 1916. The Kings County Trust Company was granted letters testamentary on March 31, 1916 and letters of trusteeship on October 24, 1934.

By the ninth paragraph of the will testator gave his residuary estate to his executor, in trust, to pay the net income arising therefrom to his wife, for and during her life. The wife died on March 11, 1959. The will provides that upon her death ‘said trust is to terminate, and the corpus thereof is to go, and I give, devise and bequeath the same, in equal shares, among my then surviving nephews and nieces, and the issue of any deceased nephew or niece (except issue of my niece), such issue taking in equal shares the share their parent would have taken if living. It being my intention not to make the issue of the niece beneficiaries under this my Will.’ The trustee brought this proceeding for the judicial settlement of its account and has requested in its petition ‘That the Court find and determine that, in accordance with the intent of said decedent, as set forth in Paragraph Ninth of his said Will, the net distributable principal of said now terminated trust is primarily divisible into four equal major shares, one each for the lawful issue living at such termination and who represent decedent’s deceased nephews and nieces, respectively, the issue of each said deceased nephew and niece, respectively, to receive, in equal sub-shares, per stirpes, the equal major share which the deceased nephew or niece whom they represent would have taken, if living; and direct distribution accordingly.

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In a probate proceeding, the petitioner, appeals from so much of a decree of the Surrogate’s Court, Kings County, dated July 1, 2004, as denied that branch of her cross motion which was for the issuance of preliminary letters testamentary to her for the estate of the decedent and granted those branches of the motion of the objectant, which were to deny the issuance of preliminary letters testamentary to the petitioner for that estate, to disqualify the petitioner from service as executrix, and to issue letters of administration to the objectant.

A testator or testatrix has the right to determine who is most suitable among those legally qualified to settle his or her affairs, and that selection is not to be lightly discarded. While the Surrogate may disqualify a person from receiving letters of administration where the friction between such person and a beneficiary interferes with the proper administration of the estate.

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In a probate proceeding in which legatee petitioned pursuant to SCPA to compel the payment of a legacy, nonparty appeals, by permission, from so much of an order of the Surrogate’s Court, Kings County, dated December 4, 2008, as, sua sponte, disqualified his law firm, and all members and associates of that firm, from appearing as the petitioner’s attorney.

The appellant was employed for many years as chief court attorney of the law department of the Surrogate’s Court, Kings County (hereinafter the Law Department). In February 2008, shortly after retiring from government service, he joined the Rubenstein firm, a small law firm specializing in estate practice. Prior to his association, the Rubenstein firm was composed of only two other attorneys. In late November or early December 2006, before appellant left his employment as chief court attorney, the firm was retained to represent the petitioner in this Surrogate’s Court proceeding.

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The testator left him surviving his widow, three sons, and one daughter, who were his sole heirs at law and next of kin. One of the sons, died June 29, 1900, leaving him surviving three children, one of whom is the plaintiff in this action; the widow, died September 22, 1904, a little over four years after the death of her son, the father of the plaintiff.

At the time of the testator’s death his children were under age and unmarried. The testator died seized of certain real estate in the states of New York, New Jersey, and Vermont. The plaintiff brought this action to partition lands in the county of Kings in this state, asserting she had an interest therein for the reason that under the terms of the will of the interest of her father, one of the remainder men, was subject to be divested by his death during the lifetime of his mother, the life tenant, and upon the death of the latter, having predeceased her, plaintiff with her sisters who were defendants in this action became vested with the share of their father, under the will. The trial justice decided in favor of plaintiff. The judgment entered upon that decision was reversed by the Appellate Division, and the complaint dismissed. Plaintiff and her sisters, defendants, appeal to this court.

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This action is brought to restrain the violation or the threatened violation by the defendant of a certain restrictive covenant claimed by plaintiffs to affect the lots or parcels of land within an area located in the Borough of Brooklyn now or heretofore known as “Manor’”. The area in question is bounded on the west by Flatbush Avenue, on the north by Lincoln Road, on the east by Rogers Avenue and on the south by Fenimore Street.

In the year 1893, the decedent died testate seized of said real property. His will was duly admitted to probate by the Surrogate of the County of Kings. By said will the testator’s real property was devised to his children and his executors were given a power of sale.

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This was a proceeding brought by BS, the executor of the estate of her father, LS, before the Surrogate’s Court of the City of New York, Nassau County, to determine the validity of a claim made by the Nassau County Department of Social Services against the estate for public assistance rendered to ZS, LS’s wife, from 10 June 1996 to 3 October 2002, while LS was still alive.

LS and ZS had two children, BS and MS, who is mentally retarded.

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As an incident to trustee’s intermediate account of four trusts created under articles ‘Seventh,’ ‘Eighth’ and ‘Ninth’ of the will, the Court’s instruction is sought as to the investments authorized by article ‘Fourteenth’ of the will and as to significance to be given to the term ‘fiscal agent’ as used therein.

The Testator died a resident of Kings County, on February 14, 1924, leaving a will dated May 11, 1920, which was admitted to probate on April 11, 1924. The petitioner’s predecessor, a trust company, was appointed executor and trustee thereunder.

The portion of the will to be construed expressly states that the authority to invest shall be limited by the following: ‘Nor shall it invest in any shares or securities of which it may be promoter or underwriter, or of any corporation for which it shall be the fiscal agent.’

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This was a proceeding brought before the Surrogate’s Court, Suffolk County, for the accounting of AFS, as administrator c.t.a. of the estate of WPS. A stipulation was submitted to the court for its approval and incorporation into the provisions of an intermediate accounting decree. Jurisdiction has been obtained over the necessary parties to the proceeding, and no one appeared in opposition to the relief requested by the petitioner.

On 17 March 1980, the decedent died testate, and was survived by his spouse and an infant daughter, born of the marriage between himself and his former wife, who also survived him.

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In this probate proceeding, the proponent, one of the decedent’s daughters and the sole residuary legatee under the propounded instrument dated March 8, 1983, seeks leave to move for summary judgment more than 120 days after she filed a note of issue. In the event that the first branch of the application is granted, the proponent moves for summary judgment dismissing the objections to probate interposed by one of her sisters and admitting the will to probate. The objectant’s papers in opposition only address the proponent’s motion for summary judgment.

The issue in this case is whether the motion for summary judgment dismissing the objections to probate should be granted.

The court said that CPLR 3212 (a) application for leave to move for summary judgment may only be granted “on good cause shown.” Although the proponent’s motion was not filed with the court until more than eight months after the note of issue was filed, the objectant is primarily responsible for the proponent’s delay in moving for summary judgment because the objectant requested additional disclosure after the note of issue was filed and then failed to conduct the requested deposition in a timely fashion. Specifically, after the note of issue was filed, the objectant moved to strike it and sought further disclosure. That application was granted to the extent that the objectant was granted leave to conduct a deposition that she requested no later than approximately five months after the date the note of issue was filed. The parties thereafter extended the time to conduct the deposition for a period of approximately two more months. After the objectant’s counsel cancelled an agreed-upon deposition date, the proponent’s counsel notified him that he would not agree to any further extensions without a court order. The objectant never moved for another extension to conduct the deposition and the instant application was filed approximately one week after a pretrial conference with the court.

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This is a motion for an order directing the proponent, who is decedent’s widow, to appear for an examination before trial to enable petitioner to frame objections to the propounded instrument bearing date March 10, 1961, and for other relief. The filing of a petition and service of a citation in a Surrogate’s Court proceeding is analogous to the service of a summons and complaint in an action brought in a court of record pursuant to the Civil Practice Act (Surrogate’s Court Act, § 48; Matter of Joslin’s Estate, 74 Misc. 332, 134 N.Y.S. 229).

The issue in this case is whether petitioner’s motion for an order directing the proponent, to appear for an examination before trial to enable petitioner to frame objections to the propounded instrument bearing date March 10, 1961 should be granted.

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