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Two probate proceedings were brought before the court for resolution.

A New York Probate Lawyer said in the first case, the Court was required to determine the manner in which payment of the residuary bequest shall be made. As provided for under the will’s eleventh article, the residuary estate was bequeathed to a resident of Poland to be hers absolutely and forever. A provision followed to the effect that she would go to New York City to receive payment.

Here, the language requiring that the payment be made in New York City must be construed as a precatory provision in no manner affecting the absolute nature of the bequest made. As per written request, the executor may make payment of the said legacy by the appropriate transfer of the funds to the said legatee after 10 July 1962 when she shall have attained her majority, in the manner set forth by the Court in the case entitled Matter of Tybus’ Will.

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A New York Probate Lawyer said that on 11 April 2007, the decedent died leaving a will dated 7 August 1997. She was survived by her two sons, A and B, and a granddaughter, CC, issue of a predeceased daughter, C.

Under the decedent’s will, her estate was to be divided equally between her two sons, and the issue of her predeceased daughter. It was provided in the will that, where any part of the estate vests in a minor, the executor named is authorized and empowered in his absolute discretion, to hold the property so vested in such minor and to invest and reinvest the same, collect the income therefrom, and during the minority of such minor, to apply so much of the net income therefrom or of the principal thereof for the care, support, maintenance or education of such minor as the executor deems it necessary and to accumulate any such income not so paid, if any, and to invest and reinvest same until said minor shall attain the age of 21 years, at which time the accumulated income and unexpended principal shall be paid over to him; the authority conferred upon the executor must be construed as a power only and cannot operate to suspend or prevent absolute vesting of any property in such minor; with respect to any such property which shall vest in absolute ownership in a minor or minors but which shall be held by the executor as authorized, the executor is entitled to such commissions at the rates and manner payable to a testamentary trustee with the same power and authority. The decedent nominated her three children as co-executors and directed that they serve without bond. The estate was valued at approximately $345,000.

Consequently, a probate proceeding was instituted. At that time, CC was a minor and a guardian ad litem was appointed to represent her. The guardian ad litem had no objections to the will being admitted to probate. However, the guardian ad litem recommended that the infant’s share of the estate be placed in trust with the Public Administrator to act as Trustee.

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On 16 July 1983, a decedent died leaving a will. He was survived by several children, one of whom receives less than his distributive share in the estate under the propounded will.

A New York Probate Lawyer said that on 8 September 1983, the probate petition, a will contest proceeding, was filed and on 9 November 1983, jurisdiction was complete. On 14 December 1983, preliminary letters were issued to the nominated fiduciary on consent. On 3 January 1984, objections were filed by the partially disinherited son. On 6 February 1984, examinations before trial were complete. Approximately 10 months after the filing of the objections, the partially disinherited son moves to dismiss the petition on the ground that the decedent was not domiciled in Nassau County but in Bronx County.

As provided for under Article 2 of the Surrogate’s Court Procedure Act, jurisdiction over domiciliaries of the State of New York rests solely with the county where the decedent died domiciled.

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The document sued upon is a Family Trust.

On 19 May 1999, a Family Trust, a revocable inter vivos trust, was created. It is a 29-page document with nine articles. A, the settlor, is the mother of plaintiff and defendant. A, and her husband, B, are the co-trustees.

A New York Probate Lawyer said that according to the Family Trust, its purpose is to hold property, which was attached to and made part of the agreement, together with such monies, securities and other assets as the trustee may thereafter at any time hold or acquire (said monies, securities and other assets, referred to collectively as the “Trust Estate”) for the purposes of providing income to the settlor during her lifetime, paying her funeral expenses, estate taxes, probate fees, legal and accounting fees related to her estate, satisfying any cash bequests, all inheritance taxes, funding a marital share deduction, providing income for the benefit of her husband or their children during her husband’s lifetime and upon his death, paying the balance of the Trust Estate to their children, per stirpes. Further, the Family Trust agreement provided that if A died, the balance of the Trust Estate would be distributed to her husband if he survived her, and that upon his death, or the settlor’s death if her spouse predeceased her, the trustee would pay the balance of the Trust Estate to the settlor’s children, per stirpes.

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In a probate proceeding, the petitioner woman appeals from an order of the Surrogate’s Court dated October 16, 2007, as, after a hearing, granted those branches of the motion of the opponent man, which were to disqualify the petitioner from serving as executor for the estate of a woman and to reinstate letters of administration previously issued to the opponent man.

A New York Probate Lawyer said the court ordered that the order is reversed with costs, that branch of the motion of the opponent man, which was to disqualify the petitioner woman is granted only to the extent of requiring the petitioner to retain new counsel for the estate and that branch of the motion is otherwise denied, that branch of the motion which was to reinstate letters of administration previously issued to the opponent man is denied, and the matter is remitted to the Surrogate’s Court for further proceedings.

The right of a testator or the person who made the will to designate, among those legally qualified, who will settle his or her affairs, is not to be lightly discarded. However, the Surrogate Court may disqualify an individual from receiving letters of administration where friction or hostility between such individual and a beneficiary or a co-administrator or co-administratrix, especially where such individual is at fault, interferes with the proper estate administration, and future cooperation is unlikely.

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The Facts of the Case:

On 18 October 2007, a decedent died and is survived by his daughter-one and his granddaughters, A and B, the children of predeceased daughter-two, as his sole distributes. The decedent’s wife had predeceased him in September 2003. After the death of the decedent, the petitioner instituted an SCPA 2103 discovery proceeding. A New York Probate Lawyer said the petitioner is granddaughter B, who resides in Florida and to whom limited letters of administration (for estate administration purposes in an estate litigation) issued for the sole purpose of prosecuting the discovery proceeding and the respondent is daughter-one, who resides in Selden, Suffolk County. The property, subject of the proceeding, is a parcel of real property in Massapequa Park, Nassau County, and three bank accounts. Apparently, the real property was conveyed by the decedent to the respondent by deed dated 26 August 2004 and recorded 7 September 2004. The deed purported to convey all of the decedent’s right, title and interest in the property, except that it reserved a life estate in the decedent. At the time of decedent’s death, the bank accounts were held either jointly between decedent and respondent or solely by respondent.

In the SCPA 2103 proceeding, petitioner alleges that respondent was in a confidential relationship with the decedent and used that relationship to exert undue influence upon the decedent to convey the real property and change the title and/or beneficiary designations on the subject accounts. In opposition, respondent denies petitioner’s allegations and contends that all the transactions reflect the exercise of the decedent’s own free will. The respondent now moves for a summary judgment and for an order dismissing the petition and canceling a notice of pendency filed against the decedent’s former residence.

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The Facts of the Case:

On 22 February 2004, a resident of Hicksville died with a will dated 6 November 2002, months after a guardian was appointed on her behalf under Mental Health Law Article 81. The decedent left all of her property, other than a $15,000.00 bequest to a corporation, to “A”, to the exclusion of her family members. The will named “X” as executor and after he offered the will for probate it was revealed that he had a felony record, making him ineligible to serve as a fiduciary. Thus, on 2 May 2005, “X” renounced his appointment. A New York Probate Lawyer said the nominated successor to the named executor had previously renounced her appointment as well.

On 4 May 2005, “A” petitioned the court for letters of administration, for estate administration (estate litigation). However, “A” also had a felony record and was ineligible to serve. Therefore, on 9 June 2005, the court appointed the Public Administrator of Nassau County as temporary administrator. The decedent’s distributees appeared and filed objections to the probate of the will, and notices of appearance were filed on behalf of “A”, the New York State Attorney General and the aforementioned corporation. On 22 November 2005, all of the interested parties entered into a stipulation of settlement. On 1 February 2006, the will, as reformed and restated by the settlement agreement, was admitted to probate, and full letters of administration, were issued to the Public Administrator. Under the terms of the stipulation, articles second and fifth of decedent’s will were reformed so that three of the decedent’s distributes will share in 2/3 of the decedent’s real property and her residuary estate; the remaining 1/3 will pass to “A”; that the decedent’s real property will pass to these parties in kind, so as not to be subject to a commission, and that the property would be sold and the proceeds held in an attorney’s escrow account; and that before any distributions are made to the interested parties from the escrow account, the sales proceeds will be used to pay the bequest to the aforesaid corporations, the commission of the Public Administrator, and all debts, fees and estate administration expenses of the estate.

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The Facts of the Case:

On 30 December 2006, the decedent died a resident of Nassau County leaving a last will and testament dated 13 July 2006. On 19 March 2007, the will was admitted to probate and letters issued to A and B as co-executors and co-trustees. After making some specific bequests, the decedent left her residuary estate to her four daughters, A, B, C, and D, in equal shares; and placed C’s share in a Supplemental Needs Trust under her name created pursuant to Article Fourth of the will. Under the will, the trustees were given discretion in distributing income and principal to C; that at C’s death, the remainder of the trust, if any, will pass to C’s son, CC; and D is the named successor fiduciary. The estate contains approximately $125,000.00 in personal property and three homes, which are valued in the aggregate at $1,285,000.00.

Thereafter, a New York Probate Lawyer said five miscellaneous proceedings were filed with the court in connection with the estate administration and that of the trust. On 10 December 2008, some of the issues raised were resolved in a stipulation of partial settlement entered into by all the interested parties, viz: that A and B, as co-trustees of the supplemental needs trust, would enter into a contract for the purchase of property-two which C and CC agreed to use as their long-term primary residence; that C and CC, who were residing in decedent’s real property, property-one, would vacate that property and move to property-two; and that the fiduciaries are obliged to put property-one up for sale within 90 days after respondents move out. Pursuant to the agreement, the co-executors purchased property-two and made it available to respondents as of 16 March 2009. Nonetheless, respondents refused to move out of property-one, and the agreement does not specify a date by which they are required to do so.

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The Facts of the Case:

On 26 October 2000, a decedent died with a Last Will and Testament dated 23 March 1995. Under the will, the decedent left her estate to her two sisters, A and B, or the survivor; named A as executor and B as successor. A predeceased the decedent without issue, thus, the entire estate passed to B.

Sometime in 2005, B petitioned for the appointment of a guardian of her property. The court, finding that B had a history of poor judgment with regard to her real and personal property management, appointed the petitioners, X, a niece, and Y, Esq., as guardians of B’s property. Consequently, in May of 2007, the judge authorized petitioners to petition to probate the 1995 will. By this time, the original could not be located and the petitioners petitioned to probate a copy of the 1995 will as a lost will. The affidavit of X stated that she located the copy among the decedent’s important papers after her death; that while the decedent must have had the original will, her house had been sold and the purchaser threw away all of her papers. The affirmation of Y also stated that after the decedent’s death, her home was taken over by a former handyman of B, who threw away all of the decedent’s papers. Allegedly, the instrument was prepared by an attorney, who supervised its execution and was a subscribing witness, and has filed an affirmation of due execution.

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The Facts of the Case:

On 8 January 2006, the decedent died with a will dated 31 December 1993. On 26 April 2007, the decedent’s will was admitted for probate (will contest proceeding) by the court and a decree was thereafter issued, and letters testamentary also issued to the decedent’s wife as executor of the estate of her husband, the decedent (for estate administration as may be determined in estate litigation). At the time of the decedent’s death, he owns a surveying business.

On 12 December 2007, an Asset Purchase Agreement was entered into between the decedent’s wife and “A” where “A” agreed to purchase the decedent’s business and all of the assets used in connection with the business. The purchase price was $375,000.00. On 14 December 2007, “A” executed a promissory note in the sum of $200,000.00. The note was guaranteed by a Land Surveyor company, “X”. The terms of the promissory note provide that “A” will pay the sum of $200,000.00, together with interest thereon at the rate of 5% per annum, in sixty consecutive monthly payments of principal and interest, each of which, except the last, was required to be in the sum of $3,774.25, the first payment to be made before 14 January 2008.

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