Nassau

Published on: February 12, 2015

Court Rules on Proceeding to Settle Executors Account

by Stephen Bilkis

Sources show that this is a proceeding to settle the executor’s account of a Trust Company. Objections have been filed on behalf of the deceased to the said accounting. The objectant claims title to one-third (1/3) of all property received by the executor as set forth in the account, or, in the alternative objectant seeks to recover the alleged consideration given for the promise to exercise the powers in his favor. The remaining objections are to any charges being made against the property claimed by the objectant.

A Probate Lawyer said the objectant is the only child of the decedent’s marriage to his first wife. At the time of his marriage, and at all times thereafter, decedent was the donee of a testamentary power of appointment in each of two trusts. The first of these powers in a general power of appointment granted to the decedent under the will of his mother. The second is a general power of appointment reserved to the decedent under an inter vivos trust indenture, made by the decedent as grantor. Sometime in 1942 the decedent and his first wife, entered into a separation agreement which provided that in consideration for the wife relinquishing all of her marital rights and claims to the decedent’s property, the decedent would pay to her the sum of $450, plus $100 per month to be used for the support of the objectant until he reached the age of 21 years. The decedent further agreed to maintain irrevocably certain policies of insurance on his life with the objectant as designated beneficiary. No evidence was offered at the hearing in respect to the existence of any such life insurance. The only payment made by the decedent under the 1942 agreement was the sum of $250, paid to the wife at the time of the execution of the agreement. None of the monthly payments was made.

A New York Estate Lawyer said he decedent and the wife were divorced pursuant to a decree of the Circuit Court, Florida. Both the decedent and the wife remarried. A judgment was obtained against the decedent in the sum of $1,567.90 for unpaid monthly installments due under the 1942 agreement. Thereafter, the decedent, wife, and their respective spouses entered into an agreement in order to ‘amicably settle and adjust’ these differences. The 1944 agreement provided that the wife’s second husband, would adopt the objectant. The decedent consented to the adoption and agreed to lend all necessary assistance to effect same. The wife agreed to promptly procure a satisfaction of the $1,567.90 judgment previously entered, and the wife and her second husband further agreed to hold the decedent safe and harmless from making any further payments of $100 per month as required by the 1942 agreement. Finally, the decedent agreed to exercise his testamentary powers of appointment irrevocably in such a manner which, in view of subsequent events, would result in the objectant receiving a one-third interest in the principal of the trusts. Simultaneously, with the execution of the 1944 agreement, decedent executed a Will providing for the exercise of the power in objectant’s favor. On that very same day an order of adoption was made providing for the adoption of the objectant by the second husband.

Published on: December 18, 2014

Plaintiff Seeks to Increase Damage Amount

by Stephen Bilkis

Probate Lawyers said the defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Richmond County, which granted the plaintiff’s motion to remove the case from the Civil Court of the City of New York to the Supreme Court, Richmond County, to amend the complaint to set forth a cause of action for wrongful death and to increase the amount of damages requested.

Following an automobile accident which occurred on July 10, 1971, the plaintiff brought this action in the Civil Court of the City of New York, Richmond County, on May 24, 1972, alleging negligence on the part of the defendants and requesting a total of $14,000 damages for injury to personal property, for personal injuries sustained by his son, aged 16, and for consequential damages sustained by the plaintiff-father.

An Estate lawyer said that the two automobiles of the defendants collided, sending one of them into the parked automobile in which the child was sitting. It is conceded that he died of Leukemia on August 14, 1972. On June 25, 1974, the plaintiff, as administrator of his son’s estate, moved in the Richmond Supreme Court for leave to amend the complaint so as to assert an action for wrongful death, to increase the amount of damages requested by the plaintiff, both as administrator and parent, and to remove the case from the Civil Court to the Supreme Court, which would have jurisdiction over the increased amount claimed.

Published on: December 15, 2014

Court Decides Case Reqarding Distribution of Retirement Funds

by Stephen Bilkis

An Executrix in a purported will dated June 29, 1964, has petitioned for its probate. Decedent’s brother has filed objections. The other eight distributees have appeared in the proceeding but have not filed objections.

A Probate lawyer said that subsequent to probate proceeding, all nine distributees, as plaintiffs, commenced an action in the Supreme Court of Richmond County against executrix as an individual, and against New York City Employees’ Retirement System of the Board of Estimate of the City of New York.

According to the complaint, the distributees seek, in that action, to set aside a designation dated January 10, 1956, whererby the Decedent designated the said the executrix as the beneficiary of his interest in funds payable on his death by the Retirement System.

Published on: October 22, 2014

Court Decides Motion to Vacate Will

by Stephen Bilkis

A New York Probate Lawyer this is a proceeding where JPM Bank (JPM), co-executor, moved pursuant to CPLR §5015(a)(2) to vacate the decree admitting to probate the decedent’s will dated 24 June 2005 (2005 Will) due to newly discovered evidence. Several charities, the residuary legatees under a prior instrument that are adversely affected by the 2005 Will, join in the application; and, movants seek removal of JPM’s co-executors and appointment of JPM as sole preliminary executor.

The following are the pertinent events that took place:

On 12 September 2005, the decedent died at the age of 93 years. He was survived by two nephews, MF and SF, and the issue of a predeceased nephew. On 21 February 2006, the 2005 Will was admitted to probate by decree and letters testamentary thereupon issued to JPM, MF and ME.

Published on: October 12, 2014

Second Wife Opposes Preliminary Letters Testamentary

by Stephen Bilkis

A New York Probate Lawyer said a man died leaving a purported will dated March 20, 2009. He was survived by his wife from a second marriage and by five children, one of whom is under a disability. A guardian ad litem was appointed for the disabled child. The purported will provides that one-third (1/3) of the residuary estate is to be placed in a supplemental needs trust for the decedent’s wife. The remainder of the residuary estate is divided into seven equal shares with one share for each of the decedent’s children (other than the disabled child) and the decedent’s three step-children. The purported will nominates the decedent’s daughter and her husband, as executors. The purported will has been offered for probate by the nominated executors. A waiver and consent was signed by the wife from the second marriage on May 12, 2009 and filed on June 16, 2009.

The petitioners have filed an application for preliminary letters testamentary. The petition is opposed by the second wife. She has also moved to revoke her waiver and consent. She has filed an affidavit in support of the motions. According to her, she and the decedent were married in 1977. Each had been married previously, their former spouses having passed away. She had three children from her first marriage, and the decedent had five children from his first marriage. At the time of the marriage, she owned a residence in Sea Cliff, New York. Prior to the marriage, the decedent sold his residence and moved in with her.

A New York Estate Lawyer said the second wife claims that it was always their intention that upon her death, her residence would be given to her children reserving the right for decedent to reside there. In 2007, at the urging of the decedent’s daughter and son-in-law, the decedent and the second wife consulted with an attorney at which time she expressed her desire that the residence pass to her children. The attorney prepared a will for each of them and an Irrevocable Trust. The second wife claims she did not understand the intricacies of the trust agreement but was advised and assured that upon her death her children would get her residence.

Published on: September 17, 2014

Court Finds Issues with Preprinted Trust

by Stephen Bilkis

A New York Probate Lawyer said that, this case, and an analogous matter decided on the same day, raise troubling questions about the use of pre-printed or form living trusts, which are now being heavily marketed in New York State. The instant case is especially disturbing, because its trust takes the form of loose pages contained in a three ring binder. The proceeding was initiated by the petitioner” for the probate of the Will of the decedent who died on September 9, 1996. The decedent’s Will, executed April 30, 1996, leaves his entire estate to the ” Revocable Living Trust dated April 30, 1996 and any amendments thereto.” The trust agreement provides for lifetime income and principal payments to the decedent as he directs. Upon the decedent’s death the principal remaining is to be distributed to the petitioner, a friend. An alleged amendment leaves 99.75% of the principal balance to the petitioner and .25% to another friend. The decedent is the sole lifetime trustee. The petitioner is either sole personal representative under the Will and sole successor trustee under the trust, or a co-fiduciary in each. A prior Will, dated October 24, 1990, which bequeathed one tenth of one percent of the estate outright to the other friend and the balance to the petitioner, was also filed with the court. The decedent left assets of about $1 million, of which approximately $950,000 had been transferred into the trust and passes according to its terms and $60,000 remained in his name at death and passes according to the provisions of the Will.

A New York Estate Lawyer said that, in reviewing the probate submissions, the court discovered that both the Will and the trust were so ambiguously worded that it was impossible to determine the decedent’s wishes regarding one of the most fundamental elements of his estate plan–the nomination of the fiduciary. Further examination of the documents revealed a staggering number of additional ambiguities, inconsistencies, apparent irrelevancies, and outright errors, many of which pose major problems in ascertaining or effectuating the decedent’s dispositive intent.

A Nassau County Probate Lawyers said that, at this same time, another construction proceeding involving a form living trust, which contained provisions analogous to those in the document already under review, was brought before the court. The executor of the Will of concerned that the merger of legal and equitable interests in her father’s trust might render it ineffective and hence not a proper receptacle for the pour-over of his estate assets, sought a construction permitting all of the property to be disposed of according to the trust’s terms. Faced with the Howard request for construction of similar provisions, as well as with the immediate need in the instant case to identify the fiduciary and to ascertain the decedent’s intentions regarding other significant provisions of both instruments, this court determined that a construction of the instant Will and trust was necessary at the present time. The Surrogate’s Court has the power to construe a Will when construction is necessary to determine questions in a proceeding before it or to make a complete disposition of a matter. Because one major obscurity concerning the ultimate disposition of the probate estate in the instant matter involved minors or unborn as possible takers, a guardian ad litem was appointed.

Published on: August 23, 2014

Court Decides Case Regarding Constructive Trust

by Stephen Bilkis

A New York Probate Lawyer said this action to vacate a deed or impress a constructive trust was originally initiated by a man, and was transferred to another court by order. The man, as the estate administrator, requests for a decision without proceeding. A woman however cross moved the motion for a declaration that the transfer was a valid gift.

The estate came from their mother who died leaving a last will which was admitted to probate. Letters testamentary was then issued to the estate administrator. In addition to the two parties, the deceased woman was survived by three other children.

A New York Estate Lawyer said that prior to entering an assisted living facility, the deceased woman resided at her own residences. Later, the deceased woman purportedly transferred her interest in the premises to her daughter and reserved a life estate.

Published on: June 21, 2014

Will Challenged on the Grounds of Undue Influence

by Stephen Bilkis

A New York Probate Lawyer said this is a proceeding where JPM Bank (JPM), co-executor, moved pursuant to CPLR §5015(a)(2) to vacate the decree admitting to probate the decedent’s will dated 24 June 2005 (2005 Will) due to newly discovered evidence. Several charities, the residuary legatees under a prior instrument that are adversely affected by the 2005 Will, join in the application; and, movants seek removal of JPM’s co-executors and appointment of JPM as sole preliminary executor.

The following are the pertinent events that took place:

On 12 September 2005, the decedent died at the age of 93 years. He was survived by two nephews, MF and SF, and the issue of a predeceased nephew. On 21 February 2006, the 2005 Will was admitted to probate by decree and letters testamentary thereupon issued to JPM, MF and ME.

Published on: June 19, 2014

Court Decides Motion for Summary Judgment

by Stephen Bilkis

A New York Probate Lawyer said the decedent died and her only distributee, other than the proponent and the objectant, is her daughter. The testamentary assets are valued at $6,000,000. The propounded instrument establishes a trust for the benefit of the proponent equal to the unified credit. It also contains legacies of $25,000 for each of the decedent’s seven grandchildren, including the objectant’s three children. The residuary estate is bequeathed outright to the proponent and the remainder interest in the unified credit trust is bequeathed to the decedent’s daughter or, if she does not survive the proponent, to the daughter’s four children. Paragraph Seventh of the instrument explains that no greater provisions have been made for the objectant because the decedent had provided for his children during her lifetime and because he will receive benefits in the future in the practice of the law commenced by the decedent’s husband in 1947. The propounded instrument contains an attestation clause and its execution was supervised by the proponent, an attorney.

Nassau County Probate Lawyers said in support of the motion, the proponent has submitted an affidavit from his attorney, an affidavit from the sole surviving attesting witness indicating that the instrument was executed with the required statutory formalities, and the deposition of the witness. The attesting witnesses couple who lived in the same apartment house as the decedent and the proponent and had been their friends for many years. The witness husband predeceased the decedent. The witness wife was 84 years of age when she was deposed. Understandably, she did not recall all of the particulars of the execution ceremony that had occurred more than a decade prior to the deposition. However, she did recollect that the execution ceremony took place in either her own apartment or the decedent’s apartment; that the only people who were present were herself, her husband, the decedent and the proponent; and that she knew that the decedent was executing a will and that she was acting as an attesting witness.

Here, a Staten Island Probate Lawyer said the motion for summary judgment is predicated upon the deposition which occurred prior to the filing of objections and, thus, prior to the provisions of Surrogate Court’s Procedure Act (SCPA) coming into play. Moreover, the two primary beneficiaries under the will support the instant motion. Thus, the only beneficiaries who could conceivably be prejudiced by not having received formal notice of the objections pursuant to SCPA are the grandchildren, who each receive a $25,000 legacy. One of the grandchildren is a minor. If jurisdiction had been obtained over him pursuant to SCPA, it would appear that the proceeding would be burdened with the expense of having a guardian ad litem appointed for him. However, it does not appear that either the objectant or any of the grandchildren will be prejudiced by the court’s entertaining this motion prior to the service of the SCPA citation upon the grandchildren notifying them that objections have been filed. To the extent that the motion is granted, the determination will inure to the grandchildren’s benefit. To the extent that the motion is denied, they would still have the right to participate in all future pretrial procedures or proceedings, including a motion for summary judgment based upon evidence adduced at such procedures. Considering these facts, the court, in the exercise of its discretion, concludes that it may entertain the instant motion notwithstanding the fact that SCPA jurisdiction has yet to be obtained over the grandchildren. Of course, if the objectant were the party who was seeking summary judgment, the court would not entertain the motion until SCPA jurisdiction had been completed. This is so because SCPA provides that beneficiaries who were not served with the SCPA citation would not be bound by the determination denying probate to the propounded instrument.

Published on: June 15, 2014

Petitioner Files Probate Action Based on Will Contest

by Stephen Bilkis

A New York Probate Lawyer said on 17 June 2007, seven months after executing her will, the decedent, AB, died. Her husband predeceased her in 2001, and she never had any children, biological or adopted. The decedent was survived by six distributees: NK, GKH, and EKS (children of the decedent’s predeceased brother, HK; and, DK, BK, and KK (the children of decedent’s predeceased nephew, RK, and who apparently spell their surname differently, with a double last letter). The six distributees reside in Australia.

The proponent and executor, G, had been employed by the decedent as a full-time caregiver who lived in the decedent’s home.

A New York Will Lawyer said on 21 September 2007, G filed a petition for probate, stating that the decedent left no distributees, surviving or deceased. Under Paragraph 6(a) of the petition, the “name and relationship” of all persons with a “legacy, devise or other interest, or nature of fiduciary status” is asked. In G’s original probate petition, she stated that she was the decedent’s live-in companion and the beneficiary of the decedent’s entire estate, as well as the designated executor. The only other individual named by G as a person interested in the decedent’s estate is G’s sister, RG, a resident of Ukraine, who is listed as the successor beneficiary of the decedent’s entire estate and the nominated successor executor. The petition reflects 23 Alexander Drive in Oyster Bay, which had been the decedent’s home, as G’s address. In response to question 8(a), which asks whether “any beneficiary under the propounded will, listed in Paragraph 6 or 7 above, had a confidential relationship to the decedent,” G indicated that she, “petitioner,” had a confidential relationship with the decedent.