Matter of A.F.
2018 NY Slip Op 05590
Matter of A.F.
2018 NY Slip Op 05590
Matter of B.
2018 NY Slip Op 03921
May 31, 2018
The respondent MJP holdings moves for an order dismissing the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and because a prior action is pending for the same issue in a different court.
Despite the fact that the proceeding was heard on 6/1/18, the history of this case goes back 40 years, starting with the death of the decedent’s grandmother CP. That litigation was only settled in 2017. Her 2 children have passed away. The estate of one child, J, is in litigation. The case with the other child, M, is being litigated as well.
The parties involved here are the petitioner, who is the executor of the decedent’s estate, the grandchild of the decedent, and daughter’s husband, and MJD Holdings.
Matter of S.
2017 NY Slip Op. 07446
October 25, 2017
NY Slip Op 02473
This hearing was made pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law Article 81. The purpose was to appoint guardians to a person and property for Mr. & Mrs. D, who appealed a previous decision whereby the Petitioners had successfully requested to set aside a deed from July 19, 2013 because of undue influence and incompetence, and to declare the judgment void.
In this action for a declaratory judgment, plaintiffs appeal from a judgment where, following a trial on stipulated facts, the court dismissed the complaint. Plaintiffs are the only children of the husband and wife, both now deceased. The wife died first and the husband thereafter. Defendant is the second wife and the other defendant is the executor of the last will and testament of said husband.
Upon the death of the husband, plaintiffs commenced the within action seeking a declaration of their rights with respect to the husband’s estate. The complaint consisted of four causes of action, as follows: (1) To impress a constructive trust upon certain real property located at 141 Forest Green, Staten Island. (2) To void the right of election filed by the second wife under section 5-1.1 of the Estates, Powers and Trusts Law as surviving widow of the husband. (3) To impress a constructive trust upon the proceeds of a pension plan the husband had with the City of New York, which were paid to the second wife as designated beneficiary at the husband’s death. (4) To impress a constructive trust upon funds which prior to the death of the first wife had been in savings and/or checking accounts in the joint or individual names of the husband and wife, and upon other personal property which had been in the joint and/or individual names of the spouses prior to wife’s death, which the husband thereafter transferred to himself and the second wife as joint tenants.
On October 17, 1967 the husband and wife had executed a joint will which provides, in pertinent part, as follows: We, his wife, in consideration of the agreement of each of us to dispose of our property as hereinafter set forth, do hereby make, publish and declare this to be our joint Last Will and Testament. First: We give to the survivor of us all our property, both real and personal. Second: After the death of the survivor of either of us, all our property, both real and personal, we give devise and bequeath unto our children (plaintiffs herein).
This is a holdover Landlord-Tenant summary proceeding. The tenant has moved to dismiss the petition pursuant to RPAPL 721 and 741 asserting that the petitioner, as a preliminary executrix, lacks the power to prosecute a holdover proceeding on behalf of the decedent’s estate.
This case was originally returnable on September 13, 2012. Attorneys for both sides appeared. Tenant’s attorney asked that the case be dismissed and, upon the Court’s reluctance to do so without a record, requested a motion schedule. The Court set the schedule to require that the motion be filed by September 20 with answering papers due September 23 and set October 4 as a control date. Despite this schedule, tenant made no request for any extension of time and made no motion until filing papers on September 28.
The Legislature created summary proceedings in 1820 in order to give landlords a “simple, expeditious and inexpensive means of regaining possession of a premises in cases where the tenant wrongfully held over without permission after the expiration of his term.” Expeditious disposition is so much of a priority that the statute prohibits adjournment of trials by not more than ten days, except by consent of all parties. RPAPL 745 (1). In keeping with this priority, the Court set a prompt, but viable, schedule for the proposed motion. Tenant failed to file the motion in a timely manner or seek consent to extend the schedule. Accordingly, the motion is denied as untimely.
In this estate proceeding, an Order and decree, Surrogate’s Court, New York County, entered on or about May 22, 1995, which removed the preliminary coexecutors, and appointed the lawyer and a Trust Company as temporary administrators, affirmed, without costs.
The Surrogate’s removal of the preliminary coexecutors pursuant to SCPA 711 and 719 was a proper exercise of discretion, and no evidentiary hearing was required under the particular circumstances. While the Surrogate’s characterization of the facts as “undisputed” may not have been technically accurate, the unfitness of the coexecutors was established by a combination of documentary proof and the coexecutors’ own concessions, and the totality of written submissions failed to raise any triable issue of fact. We note that the coexecutors were not prejudiced in any manner by the informality of the investigation and report completed by limited temporary administrator, since the Surrogate’s decision expressly disclaimed reliance on the report’s unproven allegations.
The unfitness of the coexecutors to take responsibility for this $1.2 billion estate, bequeathed primarily to charity, was manifest. While “courts will not undertake to make a better will nor name a better executor for the testator, the standard of behavior of a fiduciary is “[n]ot honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive”.
This is an estate case where Defendant moves this court to inspect the Grand Jury minutes and to dismiss various counts of an Indictment on several grounds including legal insufficiency. Defendant also claims that certain counts are duplicitous, provide insufficient notice, and are too vague. Defendant moves to dismiss three counts of Criminal Contempt in the Second Degree on the grounds that he had not been served with any order of protection in the days of the alleged violations.
The Defendant was arrested on July 21, 1997 and charged in a felony complaint with several counts each of Criminal Contempt in the Second Degree, Aggravated Harassment in the Second Degree, Harassment in the Second Degree and Attempted Coercion in the Second Degree. At the time of his arraignment on the felony complaint, the defendant did not file notice of his intention to testify before the Grand Jury. Defendant was subsequently indicted by the Grand Jury for Grand Larceny in the Second Degree, Grand Larceny in the Fourth Degree, Aggravated Harassment (24 counts), Criminal Contempt in the Second Degree (3 counts), Harassment in the Second Degree (2 counts), Attempted Coercion in the First Degree, Attempted Coercion in the Second Degree, and Menacing in the Second Degree.
According to the Grand Jury testimony, these charges arose out of numerous incidents occurring between August 1996 and July 1997. Beginning in August 1996, the defendant, 44, was living with his 77-year-old mother, the complainant in this case. He lived with her until June 26, 1997. Defendant’s mother gave the defendant an allowance on a weekly basis while he was living with her. This allowance was given reluctantly, and allegedly coerced through threats and physical intimidation by the defendant.
This is a proceeding to construe the last will and testament of a testatrix who died on April 18, 2010, survived by five children. Her will, dated September 1, 2006 (the “Will”), was admitted to probate on July 2, 2010 and letters testamentary issued to petitioner, one of her children. Article SECOND of the Will established a credit shelter trust for her husband, with remainder to her children. Article THREE left the “rest, residue and remainder” of her estate to her husband outright. Her husband predeceased her and she provided in Article FOURTH that if her husband predeceased her, she left “all the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, real, personal and mixed and wheresoever situated”
The estate is sufficiently large to generate a New York State estate tax. Article FIFTH of the will provides that “All estate, inheritance, transfer, succession or other similar taxes shall be payable out of the residuary of my estate”. The executor asks that the Court construe the gift to real property to the devisee in Article FOURTH(A) as a preresiduary gift and the remainder clause of Article FOURTH(B) as the residuary estate. The executor brings this construction proceeding, since he claims that not all of the residuary beneficiaries agree with his interpretation.
In the Will in question, Article FIFTH directs that the payment of estate taxes be paid from the residuary estate. The problem is that the Will contains two residuary clauses. The first is found in the preamble to Article FOURTH, which disposes of the “all rest, residue and remainder of my estate, real , personal and mixed and wheresoever situated” of the testator’s estate if the testator’s husband predeceased the testator. The second is Article FOURTH(B), which purports to dispose of the “rest and remainder” of the testator’s estate after the devise of real property in Article FOURTH(A).