In a probate proceeding in which an action, inter alia, pursuant to RPAPL article 15 to compel the determination of claims to real property, for ejectment, and for injunctive relief was transferred from the Supreme Court, Kings County, to the Surrogate’s Court, Kings County, the defendants appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of an interlocutory judgment of the Surrogate’s Court, Kings County, dated January 28, 2010, as, after a nonjury trial, and upon a decision of the same court dated May 19, 2009, determining that a certain deed dated June 6, 2002, is null and void and dismissing their first affirmative defense, and upon a decision of the same court dated October 13, 2009, determining that a certain deed dated May 9, 2001, was not procured through the exercise of undue influence and dismissing their third affirmative defense, is in favor of the plaintiff and against them determining that the plaintiff holds in fee simple absolute certain real property as described in the deed dated May 9, 2001.
“In reviewing findings made following a nonjury trial, this Court may render the judgment it finds warranted by the facts, taking account in a close case the fact that the trial judge had the advantage of seeing the witnesses”. In this case, the testimony established that the deed dated June 6, 2002, was not “entitled to be recorded” until it was resubmitted with the appropriate fees attached. Accordingly, upon our review of the record, we find no error in the determination of the Surrogate that since the deed dated June 6, 2002, was not recorded, it was not delivered to the defendants prior to the decedent’s death.
The court said we decline to disturb the Surrogate’s determination that the deed dated May 9, 2001, was not procured by undue influence. The defendants failed to submit evidence supporting their contention that a confidential relationship existed between the plaintiff and her parents, who executed the deed, or that the deed dated May 9, 2001, was procured by the exercise of undue influence.
The defendants’ remaining contentions are without merit. We decline the plaintiff’s request for the imposition of sanctions.
Accordingly, the court held that the interlocutory judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
In another case the decedent initially commenced this action for personal injuries against the defendant Standard, claiming that he was injured by the inhalation of asbestos. Special Term granted the motion of the decedent’s daughter, to be substituted as the plaintiff in place and stead of her father in her capacity as the executrix of his estate and to amend the original complaint to include a cause of action for her father’s alleged wrongful death. Special Term denied Standard’s cross motion to dismiss the complaint as against it, rejecting Standard’s argument that the Surrogate’s Court, Kings County did not have the power to declare Maurer the executrix of her father’s estate and probate his will since he was a domiciliary of Florida at the time of his death.
Pursuant to SCPA 204, when the jurisdiction of a court is called into question in a collateral proceeding, the jurisdiction is presumptively, and in the absence of fraud or collusion,
conclusively established by an allegation of the jursidictional facts contained in a verified pleading. Contrary to Standard’s assertion, there were no fraudulent statements in the petition. While the petition alleged that the decedent was a domiciliary of Kings County, it also indicated that decedent had died in a Florida nursing home. In addition, annexed to the petition were papers intended to inform the Surrogate of the decedent’s connection with Florida. Thus, the Surrogate was supplied with all of the relevant facts, and in the absence of fraud, the defendant has no standing in a collateral proceeding to have the determination overturned.
Standard’s alternative argument for dismissal of the action is equally unavailing. The proposed amended complaint sets out a sufficient cause of action for wrongful death. In any event, Standard advances arguments more appropriately considered on a motion for summary judgment. If this is indeed what Standard was seeking, its cross motion was premature as issue had not yet been joined (CPLR 3212[a] ).
Finally, Special Term properly retained jurisdiction over the action to recover damages for personal injury and wrongful death, as the instant lawsuit involves independent matters involving controversies between living persons and not matters affecting the estate of the decedent.
If you have a claim against the estate, seek the help of Stephen Bilkis and Associates in order to file your claim. They have offices to serve you throughout New York, including locations in Manhattan, the Bronx, Brooklyn Queens, Staten Island, Nassau County, Suffolk County and Westchester County.