Articles Posted in Estate Administration

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Defendant moves, pursuant to subdivision 8 of Rule 107 of the Rules of Civil Practice, to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint on the ground that the cause of action cannot accrue against the infant defendant because of his infancy.

Probate Lawyers said the action is brought by the infant plaintiff against the infant defendant for a separation on the ground of alleged cruel and inhuman treatment. It appears from the papers before the court that both of the parties are under 21 years of age. Before instituting this action, plaintiff applied for and secured the appointment of a guardian ad litem. Thereafter, the summons and complaint were served upon both the infant defendant and his father with whom he resided. Defendant now asserts that plaintiff should have applied for the appointment of a guardian ad litem for the defendant before making service of the summons and complaint herein.

A New York Estate Lawyer said the issue before the court is whether it is the obligation of the plaintiff to apply for and secure the appointment of a guardian ad litem for the defendant prior to the service of process, or whether it is the obligation of the defendant, after having been served with the summons and complaint, to himself apply for such relief.

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Probate Lawyers said this is a final accounting by the trustee in respect of the residuary trust which terminated upon the death of testator’s widow and life beneficiary on April 16, 1957. In conjunction therewith the Court is required to construe the will, particularly article ‘Eighth’ subd. ‘(2)’ thereof. The construction involves the applicability of Decedent Estate Law, § 47-a, which reads as follows:

If a person dying after this section takes effect shall devise or bequeath any present or future interest in real or personal property to the ‘issue’ of himself or another, such issue shall, if in equal degree of consanguinity to their common ancestor, take per capita, but if in unequal degree, per stirpes, unless a contrary intent is expressed in the will.

A New York Estate Lawyer said that the testator died on December 10, 1936, leaving a will dated November 14, 1930, and two codicils, all of which were duly admitted to probate in this Court on December 28, 1936. Letters testamentary were issued to the widow and Guaranty Trust Company of New York who were the nominated executors, and letters of trusteeship were issued to the trust company now accounting. Testator was survived by his widow, a stepson, a brother Thomas who has since died, a nephew who is the son of a predeceased brother, and a brother WWG. WWG, who died in 1942, was the primary remainderman in the article of the will to be construed. The latter was survived by an only child now known as MH. She and her first husband were divorced and both subsequently remarried. The husband was given custody of their two daughters who were born in 1940 and 1943 respectively. The construction affects the conflicting interests of their two minor children on the one side and of their mother on the other, as secondary remaindermen. The mother’s interest is said to be subject to the claims of assignees, sub-assignees and judgment creditors.

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Probate Lawyers said this is a proceeding to construe Article Sixth of testator’s will which was admitted to probate on March 9, 1961. By said article testator bequeathed his residuary estate in trust, to invest and reinvest ‘and to pay to my beloved wife so much of the income therefrom as she may require for her proper maintenance and support during her lifetime. It is my purpose and intent that my said beloved wife shall at all times have sufficient income paid to her regularly so that she may properly maintain herself in comfort. Testator then directed his trustees to resort to the principal of the trust should the income be less than $6,000 per year or in the event his said wife shall because of her personal health require hospitalization or medical care so that the $6,000 per annum is not sufficient to support her. Said Article Sixth then concludes as follows:

This provision for the benefit of my said wife is made and intended to be in lieu of any statutory or other rights in my estate conferred upon her by the laws of the State of New York. In the event that my said beloved wife shall be dissatisfied with the provision made for her hereunder and seek to contest this will, or refuse to accept the provision made hereunder under her statutory rights, in such event she shall be entitled to her statutory share of my estate and to no more, which statutory share of my estate is to be received by her in lieu of the provision made hereunder.

A New York Estate Lawyer said on May 12, 1966 testator’s wife served a notice upon the executors herein wherein she states among other things that she is dissatisfied with the provisions made for me therein (in Article Sixth) and refuse to accept same, and demand that I be paid in lieu thereof an amount equal to a statutory share, in an amount equal to one-third of the net estate together with such amount and property to which I am entitled under section 200 of the Surrogate’s Court Act.

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Probate Lawyers said this is an incident to the judicial settlement of their account the executors seek a determination with respect to the validity of the trust created by testator under paragraph ‘Second’ of the will and the effect of the widow’s notice of election thereon. Said paragraph is the residuary clause and the only dispository provision of the will.

The testator made and executed his will in the state of New York where he was domiciled in 1947. He died in 1954 in the state of Virginia, where he then resided with his wife and five children. At the time of his death testator was possessed of real and personal property situated in both states. Testator’s will was probated in this Court on July 28, 1954. Thereafter, the original will was transmitted to Virginia and also probated in that state on or about October 9, 1954.

A New York Estate Lawyer said in the probate proceedings had in Virginia, testator’s widow renounced the provisions made for her under the will and elected to take her intestate share. Under the laws of Virginia surviving spouse may elect to take against a will if it provides less than the intestate share of one-third unless such right to elect has been lawfully barred or relinquished (Code of Virginia, §§ 64-20, 64-27, 64-32).

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The two cases below are about probate proceedings.

Probate Lawyers said in a probate proceeding to judicially settle the final accounts of an estate, the successor administrator, KG, appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of a decree of the Surrogate’s Court, Kings County (Lopez Torres, S.), dated December 3, 2009, as, after a nonjury trial, denied his objections to and judicially settled the final account of KTLG, the original administrator of the estate, and granted the objections of Wendy Walton to his amended final account.

In an accounting proceeding, the party submitting an account has the ultimate burden of demonstrating that he or she has fully accounted for all of the assets of the estate (see Matter of Tract,284 AD2d 543; Matter of Schnare,191 AD2d 859, 860). While the party submitting objections bears the burden of coming forward with evidence to establish that the account is inaccurate or incomplete, upon satisfaction of that showing the accounting party must prove, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, that his or her account is accurate and complete (Matter of Tract, 284 Ad2d at 543; see Matter of Campione,58 AD3d 1032, 1034; Matter of Schnare, at 860).

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The committee of an incompetent moves for permission to file objections to the account of the Executor of the Last Will and Testament of the incompetent’s mother and for leave to obtain a construction of her will in respect to the validity of certain provisions for charitable bequests which, in his opinion, contravene the provisions of section 17 of the Decedent Estate Law. Said section provides that not more than half of an estate may be bequeathed to charity where the decedent is survived by a child or certain other close relatives.

Probate Lawyers said the incompetent’s mother died on July 11, 1956, leaving a Last Will and Testament which was duly admitted to probate by the Surrogate’s Court of Kings County on December 21, 1956.

By the terms of her will the decedent bequeathed one half of her residuary estate to eight charitable organizations in equal shares. The other half of her estate she bequeathed to a trustee in trust for the incompetent herein with directions to the trustee to pay the income to the Central Islip State Hospital for his care and maintenance and, in its discretion, to invade the principal to the extent of $150 per year. Upon the death of her son the trust was to terminate and the corpus thereof was to be paid to the State of New York in payment of past care and attention.

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A Probate Lawyers said that, the executors seek a determination as to the validity and effect of the notice of election served and filed by the surviving spouse to take against testator’s will. The will, dated August 1, 1960, was admitted to probate on January 24, 1961. By paragraph ‘THIRD’, testator bequeathed 35% of his estate to his wife with the direction that she ‘devote and contribute one-third’ thereof to certain charities. The will contains no other provision for testator’s wife. The remainder of the estate is to be divided among named legatees in specified percentages.

There were no children born of testator’s marriage, thus the intestate share of the surviving spouse is 50% of the net estate. The bequest provided for the surviving spouse under testator’s will does not meet the minimum requirements of the statutes (Decedent Estate Law, §§ 83, 18). The statutory provisions in favor of a surviving spouse are remedial and are to be liberally construed.

A New York Estate Lawyer said that, in another probate proceeding, co-executor and legatee under the will of the decedent, appeals from so much of an order of the Surrogate’s Court, Kings County, entered January 24, 1964, as granted $1,012.50 to lawyer for counsel fees, said amount to be a lien upon appellant’s share of the decedent’s estate.

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The widow of the testator has made this motion to disqualify the attorneys for the executors and their counsel, to restrain them from participating in the affairs of the estate and from continuing to appear for the executors in matters affecting the estate, and to require said attorneys and their counsel to restore to the estate all sums of money they have received for legal services or otherwise.

New York Probate Lawyers said that testator’s will was duly admitted to probate and letters testamentary issued to his three children as the nominated executors therein. By the provisions of his will testator bequeathed $5,000 to his widow and provided other benefits for her, not necessary of enumeration, and bequeathed and devised the residue of his estate, in equal shares to his three children whom he named as executors. The widow filed a notice of election to take her intestate share in the estate as provided by Section 18 Decedent Estate Law, and instituted a proceeding to determine the validity of such election. The matter was settled by agreement wherein the widow was to receive 28 1/2% of the net estate with the balance being distributable to testator’s children in equal shares.

Thereafter the widow instituted a proceeding to compel the executors to account and on their failure to file the account as directed made a motion to punish from for contempt. The account was filed and objections thereto were filed by the widow and examinations of the executors were allowed with reference to such account. In addition the widow sought to compel the executors to account in the estate of testator’s first wife under the terms of whose will testator was the income beneficiary of a trust of the residuary estate with the remainder of such trust bequeathed and devised to testator’s and his first wife’s three children, the executors of testator’s estate.

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A New York Probate Laywer decedent Mrs. AH died in 1940. Her will admitted to probate, after minor pre-residuary dispositions, created a trust for the income benefit of her daughter M with remainder to M’s children. The trust was funded in 1946 and administered by co-trustees M, the income beneficiary and Mr. R. Mr. R died in 1959. From 1959 to June 1, 1977, the date of her death, the trust was administered by M, the income beneficiary, as sole trustee.

At her death in 1977, the remaindermen of the trust were M’s seven children, one of whom was P. M’s executor has now accounted as a fiduciary of the deceased trustee.

The account reveals that on October 9, 1963, M, as sole trustee, made a loan from the trust to P in the sum of $64,000. P executed a demand promissory note to the trust. As security, P executed an assignment of all his right, title and interest in his remainder interest, then (as now) a one-seventh share of the principal. P made interest payments on the loan from 1963 to 1968. No part of the principal of the loan has been repaid.

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New York Probate Lawyers said an RF died intestate in December, 1947 and letters of administration were issued to his widow, the respondent, in the same month. In September, 1948 respondent filed an income tax return for 1947 on behalf of the decedent. During the return’s audit, respondent executed three assessment waivers, the last of which extended to June, 1954 the time of the appellant, United States of America, for the making of an assessment. In May, 1954 a deficiency assessment for income taxes was made by appellant in the sum of $32,440.09 and, in August, 1954 the District Director of Internal Revenue filed with the respondent a notice of claim for payment of that sum. The respondent neither paid nor rejected appellant’s claim.

In 1962 appellant filed a petition to compel respondent to account. In defense, respondent alleged the six-year limitation period provided in the 1939 Internal Revenue Code. Surrogate Moss, as a matter of law and in the exercise of discretion, denied appellant’s petition.

The Surrogate conceded that, under former section 211 of the Surrogate’s Court Act, the filing of a notice of claim and its rejection were deemed the commencement of a special proceeding, effectively tolling State statutes of limitation.

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